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Introduction 
Since being coined by Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality has become an influential concept in 
social scientific theory and research (Davis, 2008; McCall, 2005). The central focus of 
intersectionality is “the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in 
individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the 
outcomes of these interactions in terms of power” (Davis, 2008:68). One prominent line of 
research within the paradigm of intersectionality has focused on relationships of inequality 
among categorically-based social groups, examining in particular the ways in which these 
relationships are changing over time and across contexts (McCall, 2005). South Africa represents 
an important site for the investigation of such changes, as the collapse of the apartheid
1
 system 
gave rise to a dynamic period with respect to the country’s previously rigidly racialized class 
structure. This is reflected in a substantial body of post-apartheid research that has investigated 
post-apartheid race-class intersections as they are conceptualized in official policies and realized 
in aggregate societal patterns. However, everyday understandings of these phenomena, and the 
ways in which ordinary people engage with them in interactional contexts, have been under-
examined (cf. Winant, 2001).  
In this chapter, I examine how common-sense knowledge – that is, taken-for-granted, 
“socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in everyday life, and which 
they assume that other members of the group use in the same way” (Garfinkel, 1956:185) – with 
respect to South Africa’s complex post-apartheid race-class intersections is displayed and 
                                                          
1
 This Afrikaans term, meaning “separateness”, is commonly used to describe the white supremacist racial system 
implemented in South Africa by the National Party from 1948 to 1994. See, for e.g., Clark and Worger (2004), 
Guelke (2005), and Louw (2004), for historical overviews of the apartheid system. 
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mobilized in ordinary episodes of interaction. I begin by providing a brief overview of the 
historical origins and current patterns of these race-class intersections, describing some ways in 
which they can be seen as both legacies of and departures from those of the apartheid system. I 
then present some findings from an ethnomethodologically-informed, conversation analytic 
investigation of audio-recorded data drawn from interactional South African radio broadcasts (cf. 
West and Fenstermaker’s, 1995 ethnomethodological approach to intersections between race, 
class and gender). In the first part of my analysis I demonstrate some ways in which taken-for-
granted, common-sense knowledge about race-class intersections can be produced and resisted in 
interactions. I then turn to an examination of some ways in which speakers may actively draw on 
these common-sense understandings, deploying them to do things in the course of everyday 
interactions. This analysis reveals some ways in which continuities and discontinuities in 
common-sense knowledge of race and class between the apartheid and post-apartheid periods are 
both reflected and reproduced at the level of everyday interactions. 
 
Race-Class Intersections in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Under the apartheid system, race and class in South Africa almost completely overlapped with 
one another.
2
 This was a result of the efforts of the architects of apartheid to establish a rigid and 
totalizing system that affected every aspect of people’s lives and prevented any form of inter-
racial interaction under potentially egalitarian circumstances (Clark & Worger, 2004; 
Frederickson, 1981; Posel, 2001). This system was implemented through the passage of literally 
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 A debate over the question of whether apartheid was primarily a system of class exploitation or one of racial 
domination was prominent in the social scientific literature of the time (see, for e.g., Wolpe, 1990). This debate, 
however, is largely beyond the scope of this chapter. 
4 
 
hundreds of laws, which were enforced by state-sanctioned violence on a broad scale. These laws 
included those designed to implement “grand apartheid” policies such as “separate 
development,” “Bantu Education,” and “job reservation,” which ensured that whites3 had 
privileged access to the most desirable land, educational qualifications, and professions, while 
reducing blacks to a ready supply of cheap semi-skilled and unskilled labor (Clark & Worger, 
2004). In addition, a range of “petty apartheid” laws were designed to institutionalize racial 
segregation and privilege in informal everyday settings by mandating superior “whites only” 
amenities including buses, railway cars, ambulances, libraries, swimming pools and beaches 
(Guelke, 2005). 
 This white supremacist system was interrupted when, following decades of resistance 
from both within and outside of South Africa, the apartheid government agreed to enter into 
negotiations with opposition movements (led by the African Nation Congress, or ANC) to bring 
an end to apartheid. At the time that they entered into these negotiations, the ANC had long 
avowed a socialist program (outlined in the 1954 Freedom Charter) based on redistribution of 
wealth from those who had gained it illegitimately under apartheid to those who had been 
                                                          
3
 A note on terminology: Following the convention established in the South African liberation struggle, I use the 
term “black” synonymously with “people of color,” to inclusively refer to all groups not defined as “white” by 
apartheid legislation. However, on occasions when it is relevant to differentiate between the groups codified by 
apartheid legislation, I use the distinct terms “African” (those classified as “Native,” “Bantu,” or “black” under 
apartheid), “Indian” (a term that generally included all individuals of Asian descent), and “Coloured” (individuals, 
usually of mixed race, who were not classified as members of any of the other official race groups). Of course, like 
all racial categories, these categories are historically contingent social constructions, and I use them for the purposes 
of addressing how they came to be treated as “social facts,” rather than to suggest that race is an essential, natural or 
intrinsically consequential human characteristic. 
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oppressed by the system. It soon became clear, however, that they would have to make 
substantial compromises if they were to achieve their primary aim of political rights for all South 
Africans without significant conflict (Adam & Moodley, 1993; Winant, 2001). While some 
opponents of a negotiated settlement were mobilizing for the eventuality of a civil war, the 
possibility of a mass skills exodus due to white emigration presented a concern for the ANC even 
in the absence of an armed conflict (Louw, 2004). In addition, local and global capitalist interests 
had a significant stake in South Africa’s economy, and (after belatedly abandoning white 
supremacy) had been among the most effective advocates for ending apartheid, in the interests of 
stabilizing South Africa’s capitalist economy (Louw, 2004). This made it difficult to repudiate 
the demands of capital without risking the economic collapse that threatened to result from the 
adoption of a primarily socialist and redistributive system (Winant, 2001).  
The most significant outcome of these opposing pressures for the negotiated transition to 
democracy was that whites and capitalist interests would be assured of retaining their property 
rights and the wealth they had accumulated with the help of apartheid, while the ANC achieved 
their aim of securing political and civil rights for all South Africans, and won political control of 
the country in the 1994 elections (Louw, 2004; Winant, 2001). As a consequence, post-apartheid 
South Africa has been characterized as a country with an economic system largely controlled by 
a white capitalist elite, and a political system controlled by a black nationalist elite (Louw, 2004). 
 Following their election, the ANC government made high profile attempts to alleviate 
white fears, and largely acceded to the demands of capitalist interests, taking on a corporatist and 
neo-liberal economic approach involving compromises with the largely white business sector, 
and privatization of formerly state-owned industries (see, for e.g., Bond, 2000; Louw, 2004). 
With respect to the demands of the majority of its constituents for the delivery of a better life, the 
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government has made significant achievements, providing running water, electricity, housing, 
land, education and medical care to millions who were denied these basic rights under apartheid 
(Clark & Worger, 2004). However, the neo-liberal economic approach has also resulted in 
millions of people having their newly-acquired access to services such as running water and 
electricity cut off as a result of their inability to pay the fees charged for them by privatized 
service providers (Desai, 2002). Moreover, having chosen to adopt a pro-business approach 
rather than risk engaging in more radical redistribution of wealth, the government lacks the 
resources to adequately compensate blacks for the 350 years of oppression they have suffered, to 
the extent required to make them the economic equals of whites (Frederickson, 2002). This has 
resulted in the government’s attempts to alleviate poverty and unemployment being too slow and 
not effective enough, and South Africa remaining starkly racially stratified in numerous respects 
(Louw, 2004; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). 
The South African economy still relies heavily on exploiting under-educated, cheap, and 
predominantly black labor (Clark & Worger, 2004; Winant, 2001). Unemployment poses a 
massive challenge, with an overall rate estimated at 25 percent (as of early 2011), but the 
estimated rates for different racial groups – 29 percent of Africans, 22.6 percent of Coloureds, 
11.7 percent of Indians, and only 5.9 percent of whites – demonstrate the strong racial dimension 
of the problem (Statistics, 2011). Poor black families have generally lacked the economic 
resources to move into the more desirable (formerly white) residential areas, resulting in 
continuing de facto urban segregation, with predominantly white suburbs surrounded by all-
black townships and shack settlements located on the edges of cities (Christopher, 2001). 
Although it has extended South Africa’s social welfare system considerably, a primary 
feature of the ANC government’s approach to reducing racial inequality has been the adoption of 
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market-based policies designed to facilitate the entry of blacks into the middle and wealthy 
classes. Affirmative action hiring, particularly in public service, and the program of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) have been centerpieces of this approach (Bond, 2000; Franchi, 
2003). These policies have had a substantial impact on inequality between blacks and whites, 
contributing to the growth of black wealthy and middle-classes comprising a total of 
approximately ten million people (close to 20 percent of the population), and thus to the rapid 
deracialization of the wealthier sectors of the population (Louw, 2004; Seekings & Nattrass, 
2005). However, their primary beneficiaries have generally been those already in a position to 
take advantage of them, while approximately 70 percent of the population, almost all black, 
remain systematically exploited and excluded in much the same way as they were under 
apartheid (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; Terreblanche, 2003). As a result, inequality among blacks 
(and Africans in particular) has increased dramatically, while whites (although their share of 
wealth has been reduced somewhat) remain predominantly in the top 30 percent in terms of 
wealth, and continue to disproportionately own and manage the economy (Bhorat & Kanbur, 
2007; Terreblanche, 2003).  
There is thus both substantial post-apartheid continuity and discontinuity of the racial 
economic order that operated under apartheid, as significant changes have occurred with respect 
to the substantial emerging black middle class, while poverty, wealth and inequality remain 
significantly racialized. This has led Louw (2004:178) to refer to the post-apartheid economic 
system as one of “blurred racial capitalism” (as opposed to the racial capitalism of apartheid), 
referring to the way in which the apartheid-era racial cleavage is now somewhat obscured or 
blurred, but remains largely intact in many respects.  
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In the following sections, I turn to an examination of how people in South Africa 
(re)produce and use these complex race-class dynamics in ordinary episodes of interaction. I turn 
first to an examination of the content of common-sense connections between race and class, and 
the ways in which these connections are recurrently oriented to and taken for granted, often 
collaboratively, by speakers in my data. I then explore in more detail some ways in which these 
common-sense connections can constitute interactional resources that speakers can deploy in the 
course of producing ordinary actions-in-interaction (cf., for e.g., Hansen, 2005; Kitzinger, 2005a; 
Whitehead & Lerner, 2009).
4
 First, however, I provide a brief description of the data and method 
drawn upon in the analysis that follows. 
 
Data 
The data set consisted of approximately 115 hours of interactional radio shows broadcasted on 
three different South African radio stations. This includes several hours of pilot data that were 
recorded in May 2006 and May to June 2007, in order to assess the feasibility of using radio 
broadcasts as a data source, with the remainder of the data recorded over a three-month period 
from March to June 2008. The data collection was designed to include 1) broadcasts with a high 
degree of interactivity (e.g., interviews with guests and calls from listeners), 2) both government-
operated and independent radio stations, 3) radio stations that broadcast to a wide audience, 
either through conventional radio or streaming online, and 4) shows broadcasted at various times 
throughout the day. On this basis, and based on the geographical and other self-identifications 
                                                          
4
 It is important to note that, while I separate these two aspects of race-class common-sense (their content and their 
use as interactional resources) for analytic purposes, in practice (and as my analysis demonstrates) they are 
inextricably bound together in the ways in which they are mobilized in interactional episodes. 
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provided by callers in the data, it is likely that the recordings that make up the data corpus were 
heard or participated in by people from a broad cross-section of South African society. However, 
the data corpus is by no means intended or claimed to constitute a random or nationally 
representative sample, either of South African speakers or of interactions in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The data were analyzed using conversation analytic techniques (see, for e.g., Sacks, 
1995; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2007), informed by ethnomethodological 
perspectives (see, for e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1995), and aided by detailed transcripts
5
 (see 
Whitehead, 2011a, for further discussion of the data and methodological approach used in this 
study). 
 
The Post-Apartheid Racial Common-Sense of Wealth and Poverty 
Three broad aspects of common-sense linkages between race and class were recurrent in the 
data, namely connections between 1) the racial category “black” and poverty or lack of wealth, 
2) the racial category “white” and wealth or class privilege, and 3) the racial category “black” 
and wealth, particularly newly-emerging (post-apartheid) wealth.
6
 In the discussion that follows, 
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 A list of the transcription symbols utilized is provided by Jefferson (2004), and can be accessed at: 
http://www.liso.ucsb.edu/Jefferson/Transcript.pdf. In addition, a “Transcription Module” on Conversation Analytic 
transcription (which includes links to sound files exemplifying the features of speech production that the various 
transcription symbols are used to represent) can be accessed at: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/schegloff/TranscriptionProject/index.html 
6
 It is worth noting that, while white poverty has been treated as an issue of concern for well over 100 years in South 
Africa (Terreblanche, 2003), I have as yet not located any instances of white poverty being treated as a taken-for-
granted, common-sense reality. Instead, poor white people, on the rare occasions on which they are mentioned, tend 
to be treated either as an historical problem or a contemporary anomaly. 
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I examine some illustrative cases in which these race-class intersections were (re)produced as 
taken-for-granted realities in contemporary South Africa.  
Excerpt 1 shows an instance of speakers orienting to and collaboratively (re)producing 
common-sense links between blackness and poverty. In this case a caller, in the course of 
criticizing people who he claims have not been vocal enough in complaining about an 
“electricity crisis,”7 moves smoothly between using a racial category (“black”) and a class 
category (“poor”) to refer to those he is criticizing. In doing so, and with the collaboration of his 
recipient (the host of the show), the caller treats as taken-for-granted an association between the 
categories “black” and “poor,” such that they can be used as proxies for one another. 
 
Excerpt 1: 
[172 - SAfm 4-28-08] 
1 C: .hhh I was disappointed not to hear from- from- from our 
2  black friends h um: about the electricity crisis, uh- I-  
3  I- I: think they suffer the most and it was just white 
4  people phoning in to your station, .hh[h 
5 H:                                       [I’ll tell you  
6  why:, uh=well sorry no le- I’m interrupting, sorry. 
7  (.) 
8 C: No I- I would just encourage them to share: (.) to share  
9  the crisis that they have cause I think .hhh we all suffer 
10  but I think the poor people in: in the- in the- in the  
11  outlying areas who can’t afford other forms of- of- of-  
                                                          
7
 The caller is apparently referring to a period during which demands for electricity in South Africa were exceeding 
supply capacity, resulting in regular interruptions of electricity supply to substantial numbers of households. 
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12  of- of- of electricity, .hh they suffering the most an-  
13  and- an’ we need a mouth for them when- someone needs to 
14  s- to: speak on [their behalf we need to (hear from them.) 
15 H:                 [Ja. 
 
The caller begins by expressing his disappointment that “our black friends” 8 have failed 
to call in to the radio station during a discussion of the “electricity crisis” to share their 
experiences, claiming that “they suffer the most,” but that “it was just white people phoning in to 
your station” (see lines 1-4). This raises a potential puzzle regarding the basis for the caller’s 
claim that black people “suffer” more than white people as a result of events such as this. 
Following a foreclosed response from the host (which I return to shortly), the caller explicitly 
reveals the basis of this claim by referring to the same group of people he had previously 
formulated racially, as “our black friends,” but this time using a class category, “poor people” 
(line 10). In doing so, he treats “black friends” as effectively synonymous and interchangeable 
with “poor people.” Moreover, the connection between these two formulations of the same group 
of people is further strengthened by the caller’s repetition of the word “suffer(ing)” shortly 
following both formulations (see lines 3, 9 and 12). In addition, his use of the term “outlying 
areas” (line 11) invokes the spatial arrangements legislated by the apartheid regime (see 
                                                          
8
 This reference to “our black friends” is an instance of an affiliative racial categorization that appears to be designed 
to manage the potential delicacy of complaining about “racial others” (i.e., members of racial categories other than 
that of which a speaker is an incumbent). See Whitehead (2010, 2011) for further analysis of this practice. It is also 
worth noting the caller’s apparent assumption that he can accurately racially identify other callers based on the on-
air voice samples they provide during their calls. I examine both of these phenomena in more detail in forthcoming 
reports. 
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Christopher, 1997), thereby further reinforcing the race-class intersections the caller has drawn 
upon, and implicitly linking them to the apartheid era. 
The host’s responses to the caller demonstrate his collaboration with the common-sense 
race-class links the caller is drawing on. He initially begins to respond in line 5 (even though the 
caller has projected, by taking a long in-breath in line 4, that he is going to continue), but then 
cuts himself off and apologizes for interrupting, thereby tacitly inviting the caller to continue 
(lines 5-6). Although he does not at this time complete the response he began, it is noteworthy 
that before cutting himself off he was projectably headed towards producing an account for why 
the people referred to by the caller have not called the radio station to complain (“I’ll tell you 
why:,” lines 5-6). It is thus apparent that the host was not about to treat the caller’s claim as a 
puzzle, instead showing his understanding of the caller’s claims to the degree that he was 
prepared to address the matter of why the “black friends” mentioned by the caller were not 
inclined to share their experiences on-air. Furthermore, in his next response (see line 15), the 
Host displays agreement with the caller (line 15), thereby tacitly aligning (cf. Sacks, 1995; 
Schegloff, 1992) with the caller’s common-sense equation of “black” with “poor.” Common-
sense links between race and class (specifically blackness and poverty) are thus treated as 
unproblematic, and collaboratively produced as taken-for-granted, by both the caller and host. 
Excerpt 2 shows another instance of the taken-for-granted association between blackness 
and poverty, as well as the converse links between whiteness and wealth or privilege. Prior to 
this excerpt, a caller has raised the issue of the high rates of violent crime in South Africa, and 
has questioned why government officials are not more outraged or willing to talk about the issue. 
In responding to her, the host constructs a narrative of “hypocrisy” in South Africa’s justice 
system, drawing on these common-sense links between race and class in the course of arguing 
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that some criminals are treated differently than others as a result of poverty being largely a 
legacy of apartheid. 
 
Excerpt 2: 
[156 – Safm 4-25-08] 
1 H: You know what it is?  
2  (.) 
3 H: We are in that conundrum, (0.2) where there’s a bit of  
4  hypocrisy >you see?< .hh We have a lot of poor people in  
5  this country, .h[h 
6 C:                 [Unfortunate[ly (it’s still there.) 
7 H:                             [Ja- we- eh uh lu- le- hear me  
8  out here. .h[h They’re poor, .h and that poverty came  
9 C:             [Mm. 
10 H: supposedly, .h or definitely:, (.) m- for most of us, .hh  
11  from this apartheid thing, you see? [.hhh 
12 C:                                     [Which was evil, 
13 H: Okay, which was wrong, .hh and then (.) now we’ve got (.)  
14  crime. (.) Now guess what? .hh White people (.) are getting  
15  hurt, right? .hh So, the hypocrisy says .hh “well, it’s a  
16  poor guy:, .h and that’s a white guy, .h you know, .h just  
17  don’t (.) be too hard about it.” [.hh That’s where the  
18 C:                                  [(.hh) 
19 H: problem is. .hh The integrity should say (0.2) “I do not  
20  care. 
21 C: (Yeah.) 
22 H: How you became poor, where you got poor, .hh as a country,  
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23  (0.2) it is not allowed for you to steal. (.) Okay? .h[h  
24 C:                                                       [No. 
25 H: That’s what we’ve got in our constitution. .hh Let alone  
26  murder somebody. .h So we gonna klap you. ((“klap” is an Afrikaans 
27  word meaning “hit” that is frequently employed in colloquial South 
28  African English.)) 
 
 Of particular significance in the host’s account is his production of an asymmetrical 
reference (see Whitehead & Lerner, 2009), constructing a contrast between “a poor guy” and “a 
white guy” (line 16). This reference is asymmetrical in the sense that it involves contrastive 
references to members of categories from two distinct collections, namely class (“poor”) and 
race (“white”). By producing a reference in this form, the host implicitly connects the two 
collections of categories, thereby tacitly racialising the category “poor” and tacitly treating the 
category “white” as class-relevant (cf. Whitehead & Lerner, 2009). In this way, the host orients 
to and reproduces common-sense connections between black poverty and white wealth, while 
using these taken-for-granted connections as resources for producing an account in response to 
the caller. 
The host also mobilizes, in the course of his account, other common-sense connections 
between race and class. The first of these appears in the connection he draws between the current 
prevalence of poverty in South Africa and the previous system of apartheid (see lines 4-5, 8, and 
10-11). By suggesting that contemporary poverty is a direct result of apartheid, the host 
implicitly racializes those experiencing poverty, drawing on common-sense knowledge of the 
ways in which the apartheid system was designed to privilege white South Africans at the 
expense of their black counterparts. A second apparent link between race and class is evident in 
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the host’s suggestion that “white people (.) are getting hurt” (lines 14-15). In making this claim, 
the host appears to be drawing on a narrative of white people becoming crime victims at the 
hands of poor (black) people as a result of being perceived as beneficiaries of the privileged class 
status conferred upon them under the apartheid system. 
Despite the complex nature of the common-sense linkages the host appears to be 
deploying, and despite the fact that a lot of his apparent reasoning remains taken-for-granted and 
unspoken, his recipient (the caller) shows no evidence of having difficulty in understanding his 
account. On the contrary, she displays agreement or understanding in several places throughout 
the host’s account (see lines 6, 9, 12, 21, 24). As in case of Excerpt 1, this attests to both the 
collaborative treatment of the common-sense knowledge and reasoning the host is drawing upon 
as being commonly understood, and to the collaborative process of its reproduction in 
interactions such as this one (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984).  
Excerpt 3 illustrates the third aspect of common-sense links between race and class 
mentioned above, namely speakers’ orientations to an association between blackness and wealth 
– and more specifically, in contrast to the links between black poverty and the apartheid system 
shown in the previous excerpts, newly-emerging black wealth. This excerpt is drawn from an 
interview with a guest who works as a guide for a range of outdoor and adventure sports and 
activities. In responding to a question from the host about the cost of these activities (line 1), the 
guest describes the increasing numbers of people who are coming to see them as good value for 
money, using as an illustrative example his observations of a recent increase in the number of 
“black people doing caravanning” (lines 16-17). This use of black people as an illustrative 
example appears to be designed to dispel the common-sense view that activities such as these are 
the domain of white people – a view that the host and guest have already discussed previously in 
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the interview. However, it also rests on the unspoken assumption that substantial numbers of 
black South Africans are not only developing an interest in participating in these activities, but 
have the kind of middle class lifestyles and resources required to enable them to do so. 
 
Excerpt 3: 
[132 - SAfm 4-23-08] 
1 H: Is it quite expensive, Jeff? 
2 G:  Um, (.) I think more and more people- (.) in- in the  
3  beginning people found it to be: ex- expensive especially:  
4  u:m our local tourists, South African tourists. .h[hh  
5 H:                                                   [(°Ja.°) 
6 G: U:m, but increasingly people are finding that it’s- .hh  
7  (0.2) it’s (.) it’s more (.) exciting and mor- and- and-  
8  and fun .hh to spend that amount of money, an- (.) something 
9  that you really (0.6) enjoy, .hh instead of spending: .hh  
10  six to seven hundred rand just (n-) (.) sitting: hh next to  
11  a pool at a- at a- at a .hh (.) fairly mediocre hotel. hh  
12  .h[h So:  
13 H:   [O- or drinking it away [at some uh cocktail bar I guess. 
14 G:                           [Or drinking it away you know. .hh 
15  So: (0.2) more and more people are- are: I mean I’ve seen  
16  now, over the last year, an increase in: for example .hh u:m  
17  (.) uh: black people doing caravanning for example you know 
18  because .hh it is becoming: (0.2) a better option: (.) for-  
19  for holidaying you know where .hh you really: where you  
20  really feel (.) .hh the country around you. h So: .h[h 
21 H:                                                     [O- If 
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22  I want to get uh: some of this adrenaline rushes you’re  
23  talking about how do I go about it, who do I call? 
24  ((interview continues)) 
 
The temporal formulations the guest uses in his response to the host’s question contribute 
to the production of common-sense black wealth as newly-emerging. That is, the guest initially 
formulates a period (“in the beginning,” lines 2-3) during which “South African tourists” found 
these types of activities “expensive.” He then contrasts this with a more recent period (“now, 
over the last year,” line 16) during which “black people” are participating in increasing numbers. 
In light of his apparent use of common-sense race-class links in constructing this example, this 
temporal contrast appears to allude to the relatively recent emergence of the middle class black 
people the guest is tacitly referring to. In this way, black wealth, and newly-emerging black 
wealth in particular, serves as an unspoken backdrop underpinning the guest’s claims. 
 Unlike the previous two excerpts, the host does not actively collaborate in the common-
sense the caller is apparently drawing on by showing agreement or understanding. However, 
following the guest’s possible completion of his response at line 20, the host produces his next 
question (lines 21-23). In doing so he treats the guest’s prior answer as adequate, thereby 
indicating no difficulties in understanding or accepting the answer and the common-sense 
knowledge underpinning it, and contributing to the production of the common-sense as unspoken 
but unproblematic (cf. Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 1992). 
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Using Race-Class Common-Sense 
While I have focused primarily in the previous section on the common-sense race-class 
connections mobilized by speakers, it is clear that this common-sense is not produced 
independently of the actions during whose production it is deployed, but instead is being used to 
do things in interactions. That is, in Excerpt 1, the caller uses it in the course of producing a 
complaint; in Excerpt 2, the host uses it in the course of accounting for the behavior of 
government officials, as observed by a caller; and in Excerpt 3, the guest uses it to answer a 
question and, more specifically, to illustrate a claim he is making in favor of the types of 
activities in which he makes a living. In this section I take up these features of speakers’ use of 
common-sense race-class intersections in more detail, examining additional data that further 
illustrate their mobilization as interactional resources. 
 A first case is shown in Excerpt 4, which is drawn from later in the same call shown in 
Excerpt 1 above. In this part of the call, the host responds to the caller’s complaint, challenging 
his claim that poor black people “suffer the most” when electricity supplies are interrupted. 
Although the host disagrees with the caller, he deploys in the course of disagreeing the self-same 
common-sense race-class linkages that emerged from the caller’s complaint. Specifically, he 
uses taken-for-granted assumptions about race and poverty as resources in accounting for why it 
should be expected that those about whom the caller has complained would not be more vocal 
about the “electricity crisis.” 
 
Excerpt 4: 
[172 - SAfm 4-28-08] 
1 H: But the- you know what the joke is Dwayne? .hh When your 
2  you- you (.) have electricity (.) .hh coming to your house, 
19 
 
3  but [you constantly get cut off because you can’t afford  
4 C:     [(Ja, I know.)     
5 H: to pay for it, .hh because the economy is not really working 
6  with you. .hh [When you come to power cuts, you are more  
7  C:               [Ja (but look the-) 
8 H: used to it than the guy in Sandton, .hh who’s got the 
9  generator going a lot of food [in the fridge, .hh da da  
10 C:                               [(           ) 
11 H: da, .h that’s gonna rot, if it’s- it’s not gonna happen. 
12  .hh So you will get that tho:se who are hit the most .h are 
13  the ones who are gonna complain the most. 
 
In his account, the host claims that those whose silence the caller has complained about 
are actually affected the least by power cuts, rather than being affected the most as the caller has 
claimed. In doing so, he resists the logic of the caller’s assumptions regarding which types of 
people “suffer the most,” while leaving intact the common-sense category of “poor black” that 
the caller has implicitly constructed. Moreover, the host reinforces the race-class common-sense 
the caller has produced, describing what he treats as common experiences of the “black 
friends”/“poor people” the caller identified as the targets of his criticism (lines 1-3 and 5-6), and 
using this description as a resource for claiming that such people are “used to” (line 8) living 
without electricity.  
The host also draws a contrast between the type of people the caller has complained 
about and a “guy in Sandton” who he suggests would be more affected by power cuts, and 
therefore would be more vocal about the situation (see lines 8-9 and 11-13). This may serve to 
further reinforce race-class common-sense by allusively (particularly through his reference to 
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Sandton, an affluent Johannesburg suburb that was reserved for white people under apartheid) 
setting up a hypothetical wealthy white person in contrast to the poor black people he and the 
caller have been talking about (cf. Whitehead's, 2007, 2009 analyses of allusions to race, and 
geographical locations as proxies for race in particular). 
A more explicit use of white wealth as an interactional resource is shown in Excerpt 5, in 
which a speaker uses it as a resource for joking. Prior to the stretch of interaction shown in the 
excerpt, the host and caller have discussed a study that reported substantial racial inequalities in 
income levels in South Africa. Following this discussion, the caller questions how such 
inequalities can “after fourteen years of democracy, still exist” (lines 2-3). In responding to the 
caller, the host uses common-sense knowledge of white wealth as a basis for a joking suggestion 
that the caller’s “short term solution…is to find a white girlfriend” (lines 9 and 11).  
 
Excerpt 5: 
[606 – 702 Talk Radio 5-9-08] 
1 C: Ja so now I- I need somebody that is clued up hheh .hh with  
2  eh the labor laws as to: .hh how can that .hh st- still  
3  after fourteen years of democracy, still e[xist, (and-) 
4 H:                                           [.hhh This is the 
5  issue, this is the issue, and this is why we talk about 
6  affirmative action and all the rest of it because if you look 
7  at the reality if you look at where the money is, and who’s  
8  got the power, obviously that need to change, or it needs to 
9  be leveled out at least, .hh but I th[ink your short term 
10 C:                                      [Mm. 
11 H: solution Zakele, .hh is to find a white girlfriend. ((smile  
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12  voice)) 
13  (0.7) 
14 H: hh hu[h huh huh 
15 C:      [Sorry? 
16 H: I said you[r heh heh your solution is [to find a white  
17 C:           [hhh hhuh huh huh           [.hhh 
18 H: g[irlfriend. ((smile voice)) 
19 C:  [Mm. Mm. ((smile voice)) 
 
The host’s response initially acknowledges the importance of the issue, and its 
relationship to affirmative action policies (lines 4-6), before linking the issue to the overall 
distribution of money and power (lines 7-9). Although he does not mention race explicitly, it is 
clear in the context of the foregoing discussion of racial inequalities in income that these 
distributional claims are references to racialized patterns of wealth and status. These implicitly-
produced, race-class intersections then serve as the basis for the host to joke that finding a “white 
girlfriend” is a favorable “short-term solution” available to the caller in the face of such patterns 
of inequality. That is, the host jokingly suggests that the caller could be understood as being in a 
disadvantaged class position by virtue of being black, and that he could improve his position by 
sharing in the taken-for-granted wealth of a hypothetical white partner.
9
 
In response, the caller first initiates “repair” (see, for e.g., Schegloff, 1992) in line 15, and 
then (just after the host has begun to repeat the joke), displays his appreciation of the joke, and 
                                                          
9
 Two other features of the common-sense knowledge deployed by the host in this joke are worth noting. Firstly, he 
treats racial identification of the caller as an unproblematic matter, even though the caller has not explicitly racially 
self-identified (cf. Excerpt 1 above). Secondly, he is apparently oriented to normative heterosexuality by virtue of 
suggesting that a potential partner for the caller would necessarily be female (cf. Kitzinger, 2005b). 
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his understanding of the common-sense knowledge it was based on, by laughing along with the 
host (lines 16-17). In this way, consistent with the cases discussed above, the caller collaborates 
with the host in producing as taken-for-granted the race-class common-sense underpinning the 
joke. 
A final case, shown in Excerpt 6, illustrates a caller’s use of taken-for-granted black 
wealth as a resource for complaining about the policy of racial quotas (a particularly 
controversial aspect of post-apartheid affirmative action policies) in elite sports teams. In his 
complaint, the caller argues that the quota system focuses solely on race at the expense of 
recognizing the importance of class, and that as a result it unfairly advantages black athletes from 
wealthy backgrounds at the expense of less wealthy white athletes. 
 
Excerpt 6: 
[401 - 702 Talk Radio 3-26-08] 
((Caller addressing the issue of racial quotas in sports)) 
1 C: I- I just think we need to distinguish subtly between .hh 
2  development of young players and the quota system.  
3 H: Okay.  
4 C: Um:: (.) I'm looking specifically let's say .h my son is  
5  in uh (.) standard six at a government school, .h born in 
6  nineteen ninety four, the new South Africa, (0.2) .hh I mean  
7  (in) four years' time he'(ll) be the same age as: Francois  
8  Steyn wa[s when he was selected for Springboks or super 
9 H:         [Mm.  
10 C: fourteen.  
11 H:  Ja.  
12 C: Now they- under the quota system a black guy who went to  
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13  Michaelhouse, or (.) Hilton, or one of those schools, .hh  
14  will get preference (0.2) then the su- my son who's been at  
15  a government school or other white kids who've been at  
16  government school[s.  
17 H:                  [Mm.  
18  (0.7)  
19 C: So I think (i- i-) you know the difference needs to  
20  be on development of the under com- u- (.) the under  
21  privileged communities.  
22 H:  Yes. I [agree with you.  
23 C:        [Ra-  
24 C: Rather than (0.5) putting a- a- a- a- a person of  
25  color into a side just because he’s (a/of) color  
26  irrespective of whe[ther he’s got a degree, and  
27 H:                       [Ja.                             
28 C: .h[h how rich his parents are. (E-) [Cause nobody’s  
29 H:   [Sure.                            [Mm.  
30 C: looking at the richness of the parents they’re  
31  j[ust looking at the color of the skin. 
32 H:  [Sure. 
 
The caller produces his complaint by contrasting a hypothetical “black guy who went to 
Michaelhouse, or (.) Hilton” (both exclusive and highly-resourced private high schools) with 
“my son who's been at a government school or other white kids who've been at government 
schools” (lines 12-16). He thus draws on common-sense knowledge of the disparities in 
resources between private and government high schools, and the accompanying advantages for 
young athletes resulting from attending private schools. This in turn is based on the taken-for-
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granted assumption that there are significant numbers of black families with sufficient wealth to 
pay the fees required for their children to attend schools like these, such that a policy that fails to 
take account of their existence could be seen as unfair. The caller thus treats the quota system as 
assuming taken-for-granted black poverty, and challenges it by drawing on taken-for-granted 
black wealth. The caller concludes his complaint by making this common-sense more explicit, 
suggesting that the quota system erroneously treats race as a proxy for class, “looking at the 
color of the skin” (line 13) at the expense of considering “the richness of the parents” (line 12). 
Once again (as in many of the previous cases), the recipient (the host) collaborates with 
the speaker’s use of common-sense race-class intersections, agreeing with the caller on several 
occasions (lines 4, 9, 11 and 14). He thereby displays his recognition of, and alignment with, the 
common-sense knowledge the caller is drawing on. 
 
Conclusions  
The data I have presented provide evidence of continuities and discontinuities between the 
apartheid and post-apartheid periods with respect to common-sense knowledge about race-class 
intersections in South Africa. The content of this common-sense knowledge points to the 
enduring nature of the legacies of apartheid, not just in the material structures of the society 
described in the Introduction to this chapter, but also in the ways in which ordinary people make 
sense of the patterns of wealth, poverty and inequality they observe around them. However, 
common-sense knowledge about race and wealth not always overlapping is also emerging, in 
contrast with otherwise taken-for-granted assumptions of black poverty and white privilege 
resulting from apartheid policies and their legacy. This demonstrates some ways in which the 
post-apartheid changes in the relative material conditions of people of different racial categories 
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described above have come to be reflected in everyday common-sense. These findings suggest 
that the category systems that were centrally important during apartheid have retained their 
significance in the post-apartheid period, but the content of the common-sense knowledge 
associated with the categories, and the relationships between them, appears to be more malleable 
(cf. Tilly, 1998; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009). In this sense, they provide evidence of the 
observable impacts of social changes, such as those that have occurred in South Africa, at the 
level of everyday interactional practices. 
 This analysis also points to a mechanism through which common-sense associations 
between race and class are produced and reproduced. That is, each time such common-sense 
knowledge is oriented to or deployed, and particularly when this occurs collaboratively, it is 
reinforced as being relevant or consequential. Moreover, as the data demonstrate, the utility of 
this common-sense knowledge as a resource for the production of ordinary actions (such as 
complaining, accounting, answering, disagreeing, joking, and so on) provides a basis for its 
ongoing production and reproduction in the course of everyday interactions. In this regard, it is 
worth emphasizing that, although matters of both race and class are topicalized in various ways 
in the interactions I have examined, the common-sense links between them are recurrently not 
examined or interrogated, instead remaining largely taken-for-granted even as they are deployed 
as interactional resources. Thus, in using this common-sense knowledge, speakers and recipients 
recurrently leave much unspoken, treating its relevance as self-evident rather than specifying or 
interrogating precisely why or how it is relevant. That this does not recurrently (if ever) result in 
difficulties in understanding among co-participants points to the interactional accomplishments 
involved in producing this type of common-sense knowledge as an unproblematic backdrop to 
the matters they are discussing. 
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Finally, and in light of the above points, these findings demonstrate the significance of 
everyday talk-in-interaction as a site at which social structures (for example, those related to race 
and class) are both reflected and reproduced. Thus, on the one hand, common-sense knowledge 
about South Africa’s race and class structures (both historical and contemporary), and the 
ongoing links between them, is mobilized as an interpretive resource whenever speakers mention 
or orient to race-class intersections in the course of their interactions. At the same time, everyday 
interactions provide an ever-present set of places in which race-class common-sense can be made 
relevant, and thereby get renewed and reproduced, but also resisted and challenged. 
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